On the one hand, we have a commission from the House to bring about the credibility and accountability in the U.S. intelligence community.

Against this, we must measure the possible damage to national security that could result from any unwise action by the Congress. We simply do not want to arm our adversaries with weapons of our own manufacture.

So, we seek a balance between open government and the protection of the national security. There is no guarantee that such a balance even if achieved will not change.

Admiral Turner in his testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence last year alluded to another balance, that of our intelligence capabilities versus those of the Soviets and others. He said that it too was a very fine balance, one that could easily be lost.

Keeping this well in mind, the committee has asked a distinguished group of witnesses to appear before us. We have sought differing viewpoints and we have selected the foremost spokesmen that we could find.

We begin this morning session with two of the best in our judgment. Testifying first will be Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director of CIA, with whom the committee is very familiar. He will be followed by the dean of the House, Chairman George Mahon of the Appropriations Committee, one of the most respected men in this body.

Admiral Turner, we welcome you again to proceedings before this committee. We will be very pleased to hear you. You may proceed as you wish with your prepared statement or in any manner you wish.

Mr. McClory. Would the chairman just yield? Chairman Boland. Yes.

Mr. McClory. I would like to echo what the chairman has said and join in welcoming Admiral Turner here this morning and say very frankly and forthrightly that the admiral's appearances before this committee have certainly impressed me with his determination to do an outstanding job to strengthen and regain support for the CIA and to do an excellent job not only of management but of reestablishing confidence in the great capability of the CIA.

I certainly as one member of this committee want to indicate my support and confidence in Admiral Turner and the job he is doing.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Boland. Thank you very much, Bob.

 \mathbf{Ken} ?

Mr. Robinson. No comment at this point, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Boland. Admiral Turner, why don't you proceed. [The prepared statement of Admiral Stansfield Turner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER

Since my testimony last April before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the subject of releasing the Intelligence Community's aggregate budget figure, I have reexamined the question and discussed the situation with the members of the National Foreign Intelligence Board. I am prepared today to essentially reiterate my Senate testimony in not objecting to the release of a single inclusive budget figure which represents the Intelligence Community's budget. However, I wish to reemphasize and repeat the several important qualifications I discussed at that time.

The techniques of intelligence collection and analysis change with time and with technology. The breakdown of the intelligence budget accurately re-

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M. STANSFIELD TURNER

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and analysis change with time and intelligence budget accurately re-

flects those changes. Over time, analysis of that breakdown could reveal to any interested observer our areas of interest and the technologies on which we depend. From such information, others could learn where they should place emphasis in countermeasures in order to nullify the advantages that we have.

In short, the detailed intelligence budget in the hands of our enemies would be a powerful weapon with which they could make our collection efforts more difficult, more hazardous to life, and more costly. The way we spend our intelligence money in this country, then, is one of our necessary secrets.

At the same time, as a free and open society, it is appropriate that the citizens, including the press, be kept as well informed as possible of the activities of their Government. They, in fact, are the best oversight we have for the prevention of possible excesses of Governmental activity. The public's right to understand the importance and cost of the intelligence process is part of their being adequately informed.

Some compromise then, is necessary between the risks of giving an enemy a unnecessary advantage over us, and of maintaining the basic openness of our society. Accordingly, the Administration does not object to your releasing to the public a single overall budget figure of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

Let me explain precisely what the figure includes. It includes the budget of the CIA and those portions of the budgets of other agencies of the Government which are devoted exclusively to national intelligence. Clearly there are many related activities in other departments, especially the Department of Defense, which make some contributions to intelligence. For instance, a military airplane flying on a training mission may well be able as a collateral function to collect some intelligence, or even carried to the extreme, perhaps, a corporal on lookout duty with binoculars could be called an intelligence collector.

The expenses of such operations as these are not included in the intelligence budget for which I am responsible and which is presented to the Congress as the national foreign intelligence budget.

Basically, the dividing line is whether we fund the activity for the primary purpose of collecting intelligence or analyzing intelligence, or whether it is for another purpose and we derive collateral intelligence benefits from it.

Finally, I must reemphasize the limitations which must prevail in issuing additional information concerning this budget figure. There will be a natural and an understandable tendency on the part of the press to want a detailed breakdown of the budget figure. This we cannot do either by the deliberate release of additional information. or by comments on the composition or character of the intelligence budget. It is here that, regrettably, we must draw the line between openness and necessary secrecy. Were we to intentionally or inadvertently disclose further details of the budget figure, we would expose those areas of emphasis and expertise regarding collection and analysis of intelligence, and over time, trends in such emphasis would become obvious. This would jeopardize the interests of our country in my opinion more than the additional information would benefit it. The people of the country can be assured, however, that we are sharing with their Representatives in Congress the full details of this budget breakdown. Hence, our response to further inquiries on the budget in the public forum must simply be "no comment." I have formally directed the members of the Intelligence Community to so respond to all such inquiries if a budget figure is released.

I recognize that this new policy of supporting disclosure of a single budget figure, and only a single figure, is a major break with tradition. It is not one without risk. I know that you gentlemen of the Committee will fully understand the importance of this new openness, but at the same time, appreciate the necessity of rigidly limiting your disclosure, if you choose to make one, to this single figure.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF HON. STANSFIELD TURNER, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Admiral Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be here on this important subject.

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